Situation Rojava

Introduction: Short summary of the geopolitical context of Rojava
The context of Rojava, western Kurdistan, can’t be understood without talking about Syria but also about the other parts of Kurdistan. We won’t extend too much on the past, but we need to start with European powers reorganizing what became known as middle east after first world war. Kurdish people, divided in 4 newly created nation states, became the largest people without state. The French protectorate of Syria lasted until the end of second world war, followed by short lived governments and military coups on 1949, 1954, and 1961. On 1963 the military committee of the Ba’ath Party that led the coup of 1961 overtook the government, and on 1970 Hafez al-Assad took the presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic. After his dead in 2000, his son Bashar al-Assad was brought from UK, where he studied medicine, to take over the presidency of the country. After some hope of democratic reforms, soon he continued the despotic and authoritarian practices of his father.

In 2011, in what became known as “Arab Spring”, a wave of protests spread from north Africa to middle east. In Syria, the Sunni Muslims that make the majority of Syrian population lead the protests against the government of al-Assad, who belongs to the Alawite minority aligned with Shia Muslims. Al-Assad responded to the protests with military repression, sparking a spiral of violence that unleashed the Syrian civil war. The regime brutally repressed the opposition protests, forcing a military escalation of the conflict. Democratic and liberal protesters suffered the most, with the Muhabarat (secret police) and the inhuman prisons of the regime ending hundreds of thousands lives. Those that survived were forced into exile, wiping out their demands and revolutionary aims. Militarized Islamist groups, backed by different Arab states and even some western powers, thrived in the war scenario, growing their ranks and becoming the main opposition to the regime on the battle fields.

In the north, Kurdish people forced a negotiated withdraw of Assad regime military personnel, declaring an autonomously administered territory. The YPG (People Defense Forces) and YPJ (Women Defense Forces) evolved from popular militias to a consistent military force, ensuring the military defense of those regions. They limited their field of action to military defense, making space for the social and political Kurdish liberation movement to promote communes and councils to take care of the civilian administration. This became the largest experiment to put in practice the ideas of “democratic confederalism”, a compilation of ideas proposed by Abdullah Ocalan, imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The main principles that guide this political project are women’s liberation, social ecology and stateless democracy, that are in many ways similar to what Murray Bookchin proposed as libertarian municipalism. This is not a coincidence, since Ocalan was partly inspired by Bookchin’s ideas of ”Ecology of freedom”.

With the rise of ISIS in 2014 and their advance over Syria and iraq, YPG and YPJ fought back to defend their land. After the historic resistance of Kobane, the Kurdish fighters of northern Syria became the main partner of the international coalition against the caliphate. Many arab regions newly freed from the fascist theocracy of ISIS joined their ranks, and the liberated areas got integrated in the system of the self-administration. The confederal system expanded, with many local and regional councils following the example of Rojava self-administration, becoming what today is known as the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES). This model has successfully integrated Arab-majority regions from Raqqa to Deir Ezzor, making also space for different ethnic and religious minorities like Assyrians, Armenians or Yazidis to build their own councils.

But the most important development is the women’s revolution, with autonomous women’s organizations like Kongra Star and Zenobia congress leading an extraordinary political process. Women have also their own military forces, with YPJ becoming not only as symbol of the war against ISIS, but also as spearhead for women rights, reclaiming a central role in the political and military developments of society. A system of co-chairs, with a man and a woman leading all social and political structures has been established. Women cooperatives are promoted to ensure economical autonomy for women. Even a women’s town has been build, Jinwar, were widows, young women or any women who don’t want to be bound to men can find shelter. They are challenging the patriarchal systems not only of the Kurdish an Arab societies, but of the entire world.

In 2015 Russia entered the war to support Bashar al-Assad, and together with Iran they managed to retake control of most of the country. Islamist rebels were confined to a small territory on Idlib, were an islamist government ruled over a small region that became densely populated, with refugee camps hosting people from all Syria. Turkey also got involved in the conflict, supporting different islamist forces in opposition to al-Assad and even organizing military operations on Syrian soil. The neo-ottoman ambitions of Erdogan, his dreams of expanding the Turkish borders over Syria, combined together with the long term war of th turkish state against revolutionary Kurds. With the excuse to fight terrorism, the Turkish army invaded Afrin in 2018, a Kurdish region of north west Syria. Another invasion followed in 2019, when a long strip of land between Serekaniye and Gire Spi was occupied by Turkish backed islamist groups. Today, once again, a new occupation plan is ongoing since December 2024.

The offensive that changed Syria
At the end of November 2024 a new offensive of Hayir Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) against the Assad regime took almost everyone by surprise. This new branding of militant salafists in Syria presents itself with a moderate face, trying to take distance from organizations like ISIS or even al-Qaida, from where they all sprouted. Their renewed military campaign started on November 27 from the front lines of Idlib, their stronghold. They rapidly overran the regime lines with their blitzkrieg attacks, aided by locally produced Shaheen kamikaze drones. These attacks were done in coordination with the Turkish proxy forces re-branded now as Syrian National Army (SNA), sometimes called Turkish Free Syrian Army (TFSA). These are the same Turkish proxies that occupied kurdish areas in northern Syria, a collection of islamist groups trained, armed and supplied by Turkey, including not just salafist organizations but also documented ex-fighters of ISIS. They started their own offensive, but instead of targeting regime territory as HTS was doing, they charged against regions under control of the DAANES. Turkish army has been aiding them in every step they’ve made, using artillery fire and air support not only of the (in)famous turkish drones, but even standard NATO F-16s.

HTS moved fast towards Aleppo, the second biggest city of Syria. The regime army, mostly young conscripts with barely enough food to survive their long imposed military service, didn’t have much will to fight. With the Russian army swamped in Ukraine, and Iran focused on its proxy war against Israel in Gaza and Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Army crumbled. People in Aleppo celebrated the withdrawal of the regime, toppling down Assad statues and symbols. HTS took control of most of the city, except the traditional Kurdish neighborhoods of Sheik Makhsood and Ashrafiya. These northern neighborhoods have been an important part of the Kurdish resistance since the beginning of the revolution in 2012, when they fought to repel attacks of salafist groups. When the regime took control of the city in 2016, YPG and YPJ forces resisted against their advance, affirming their autonomy and alignment with the Autonomous Administration. After brief negotiations HTS accepted their autonomy, promising to not attack them and to respect the historical presence of Kurds in Aleppo. Since then, they continued resisting and defending their neighborhood, expectant of how the situation in Syria will unfold.

While this was happening, Turkish proxies took control of the region of Shehba and the city of Til Rifat, few kilometers north of Aleppo. In Shehba refugee camps were a shelter for more than 150.000 people since 2018, when the Turkish invasion of Afrin forced them to leave their homes behind. Once again, more than 100.000 people had to pack the few things they had in a rush, escaping the Turkish bombs for second time. This sparked a new humanitarian crisis in the cold nights of December, with long convoys on the road to save their lives. But their escape route was blocked by the Turkish proxies, who were conducting raids, kidnappings and even summary executions on the field. Those who managed to escape made their way to eastern areas of the DAANES, where local committees and humanitarian organizations like Heyva Sor have been doing all they can to receive them. Primary needs like shelter, food, blankets and medical attention are organized on the spot, sharing the already scarce resources to the region, due to the economical embargo.

Turkish proxies continued their offensive towards Manbij, an Arab-majority city that has been part of the Autonomous Administration since 2016, when the SDF liberated it from ISIS. After expelling the caliphate from the city 8 years ago, the Manbij Military Council has been defending the region as part of the SDF. But the current attacks of SNA came with Turkish armored vehicles, drones and war planes, making very difficult for SDF to stop their advance. After several attacks and counter-attacks, an agreement for a ceasefire was negotiated between US and Turkey, evoking a 2016 agreement where Kurdish forces were not to go west of the Eufrates river. The SDF withdrew from Manbij and Turkish proxy groups occupied the region, stealing and looting whatever they could.

But that was not the end of their attacks. Turkish proxy forces tried to push forward threatening to invade Kobane. The SDF repelled their attacks on Qereqozah bridge and on the Tishreen dam, both strategic locations that that connect Manbij and Kobane regions over the river. In a move to deter further conflict, some US soldiers returned to Kobane, from where they left 5 years ago before the last Turkish invasion. The international coalition against ISIS, with US and France as currently the most involved members, are warning Erdogan to stop their attacks on SDF, which is the main force in the war against the resurgence of the caliphate. The collapse of the regime army created a window of opportunity for ISIS insurgent groups, that assaulted weapon depots from the disbanded Syrian Army expanding once again their influence over Syria and Iraq.

After the HTS offensive captured Aleppo they moved fast towards Hama, the next big city. Regime soldiers were running away without much resistance, and soon the city was under control of insurgents that started moved towards Homs. The same pattern repeated and insurgents started moving towards the capital. On December 8 Bashar al-Assad left Damascus to Moscow, pressured by the offensive that started encircling the capital city. Together with the HTS offensive in the North, armed groups in the south also started attacks on military positions of the Assad regime, getting dangerously close to Damascus from the south. With Assad gone, these groups continued advancing facing no resistance, and soon some people took control of the national television studios to read an statement announcing the end of the Assad regime. Many people went to the streets and celebrated such historical time, toppling down numerous statues of Bashar al Assad and Hafez al Assad all around Syria.

Abu Mohamed al-Jolani, leader of HTS, who had a very prominent role making videos and speeches during the offensive, made a life recorded entering in Damascus. He went to a historical mosque of the capital with his followers and announced the end of the regime, positioning himself as the central figure to fill the power vacuum. Soon he stopped using his “nom de guerre” and started using his legal name, Ahmed al-Shara, instead in all international media. The regional government that HTS had in Idlib, there called the Syrian Salvation Government, was transported to Damascus and started taking control of what was left of the Syrian State structures. They appointed ministers and promoted military commanders of the successful insurgence to become the new generals and colonels of what is becoming the new Syrian army. The US department of justice removed al-Jolani from their list of wanted terrorists as western powers visited Damascus and reopened Syrian embassies. Those diplomatic moves were often mediated by Turkey, strong support of HTS and key actor on legitimizing their power grab. Turkey was the first to reopen their embassy and keeps deep and strong ties with the new government in Damascus.

Israel started a massive air camping targeting more than 400 positions and destroying 90% of Syrian military capabilities, as well as research and technical infrastructure. After that, the IDF started expanding their occupied areas in the southern Golan highs, expanding their control of territory on Syrian ground. Those moves were criticized by many international powers, including UN, but Israel continued their advances and air attacks, claiming that the new provisional government was a threat for Israel. Russia and Iran, key allies of the collapsed regime, started withdrawing their forces while negotiating with the new authorities to salvage what they can of their interests in Syria. ISIS tried to take advantage of this moment of chaos, organizing raids to capture weapons from the collapsing regime and looting what they can, often killing even kidnapping civilians to exchange them for ransoms.

As thousand of exiled Syrian are returning to their country, partly on their own will and the desire to return to a Syria free of Assad, and partly pressured by the growing anti-migrant policies gaining traction all around the globe, they are faced with a collapsed country after almost a decade and a half of war. Their dreams of freedom and democratization of Syria still give hope to some of them, mainly those who kept alive the embers of the revolutionary spirits of 2011. But the reality on the ground is far away from their revolutionary dreams. Many Syrians struggle to safeguard the asylum status and residency permissions that allow them to work in western countries, allowing their children to access education that offers better perspectives than the crumbling schools and impoverished universities of Syria. The fundamentalist origins of the provisional government certainly don’t help to create much trust for those who found shelter in European countries, getting more or less got assimilated by the liberal lifestyle that is so appealing for those who witnessed the brutalities of the Assad regime.

But not everyone is happy with the recent developments. Together with the kurds in the north, the Druze community in the south also resisted the authoritarian rule of al-Assad. This two communities support the change of regime but with mistrust for the new government of Damascus, calling for a federal Syria. Christian communities had certain privileges during the Assad rule, partly inherited from the French colonial rule, and are also cautious on the ongoing developments in Syria. The Alawite minority of shia Muslims, to which the al-Assad family belongs, suffered strong repression from the sunni Muslim forces that ousted the regime. In March 2025 a wave of insurgency in the western coastal province of Latakia, which was the stronghold of the regime, ambushed and killed several fighters of HTS, triggering a heavy escalation. Forces of the provisional government were deployed in big numbers, conducting extensive security operations aiming to neutralize high ranking figures of the old regime. Ethnic tensions escalated the situation as civilians were killed in those operations. Calls for revenge and jihad against the Alawite population from islamic fundamentalist groups spread on social networks. After few days of violence , with more than 2000 people killed, several regime soldiers arrested, and thousand of Alawites escaping to Lebanon, the situation got under relative control again, even if insurgent attacks continued at lower scales.

North-East Syria adapting to the changes
With those events unfolding, the SDF made some movements to take control of the areas that the regime soldiers abandoned in southern Raqqa and in Deir Ezzor, to prevent further expansion of ISIS. After negotiations with the Damascus provisional government, the SDF withdrew from those areas in coordination with the arrival of security forces connected to the Damascus provisional government. This coordination was followed by formal negotiation talks between al-Shara, as provisional president of Syria, with Mazlum Abdi, commander in chief of the SDF. Agreements between both forces have been signed in March 2025, ensuring cooperation and rights the kurdish people and other minorities in Syria as well as the integration of the SDF in the new Syrian army. Committees to follow up on those agreements are now starting to work, expecting to implement such steps before the end of 2025.

Turkish proxies continued their attacks against the regions of northern Syria, aided by the Turkish air force that continued their drone strikes and bombing all along this time. Turkey hurried to strike a deal with the provisional government after they took control of the capital, promising to integrate SNA, turkish proxies, in the new Syrian army. This gave Turkey more leverage and they managed to install several SNA commanders on important military positions. This made the negotiations to integrate the SDF in the new Syrian army more difficult, since heavy clashes between these two forces were ongoing. The druze community, who played a relevant role in challenging the regime power in the south, also entered negotiations with the provisional government with similar aims as the SDF, accepting integration on the new Syrian state structures in exchange for a certain degree of autonomy.

The provisional government, securing their position with Turkish unconditional support and with western powers accepting their position as new rulers of Syria, focused on a campaign to lift the economical sanctions that still loom over Syria. The US and EU made steps in that direction, with big numbers (billions of dollars and euros) flowing to Syria as aid relief. Arab countries also made big efforts to support the provisional government, with Qatar and other Arab states formalizing their support in economic aid. The tensions in the coastal regions raised concerns about the capacity of the provisional government to handle Syria, but western powers are willing to overlook some bloodshed if it comes with an acceptable degree of stability that enables them to further their interests. The new image of moderate Islamist that al-Shara is projecting won’t hide his fundamentalist past, but for now he is able to navigate the situation. He soon changed his military green shirt for a black suit and a tie, imitating the powerful men he wants to be accepted by, playing the role that they want him to play to integrate Syria in the global capitalist system and in the current regional order of middle east. How long he will be able to do that, how much he will manage to establish himself as the new ruler of Syria, is something that only time will tell.

The newly presented provisional constitution, even if calling for Islam as a base for the rule of law in the new Syria, is written with well adapted language to the current times. The document drafts a centralized presidential model, conceding nearly total power to head of the state. It is far away from the revolutionary proposal of the social contract that guide the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), a living document that until today is still being updated every year to incorporate new lessons learned. But the calls for a federal Syria from Kurds and Druze among other minorities are not being accounted, with the provisional government making some concessions with public speeches of inclusivity and plurality of Syria, but also finding support in narratives that frame minorities as “traitors that want to divide Syria”. “A strong man to rule a strong nation” seems the mantra that European states imposed in their reorganization of middle east after the first world war, making easier for western powers to control the highly centralized systems, and of course to exploit their abundant energetic resources of gas and oil...

The DAANES navigates the situation as best as they can. Harvesting the diplomatic connections with the International coalition on one hand, and highlighting the efforts and support from many Arab-majority areas that joined the self-administration as they were liberated from ISIS on the other, the stability and strength of the democratic confederal system provides a strong argument to negotiate with Damascus. With a conciliatory tone and openness to integrate in the new Syria, together with the diplomatic experience the self-administration acquired during more than a decade of existence in very harsh conditions, important agreements and negotiations are being hammered out today. Even when pressured by the threats of the Turkish government, eager to annihilate any trace of the kurdish liberation movement, The revolutionary structures of north-east Syria are able to hold their ground in the negotiation tables. Those agreements are for now nothing more than statements of good will, formal expression of the intentions to cooperate to rebuild a new Syria together, without legal mechanisms or clearly defined terms on how to bring those agreements into practice. Diplomacy is an important tool to overcome war situations, but military force social organization are the main element that guides the political negotiations.

Of course, all this is always encompassed by the most important development of this social system: The women’s revolution. Women in north-east Syria are leading this process with autonomously organized structures that act at all levels of society. Women’s liberation as foundation for social liberation is the pillar on which this revolution is built. From women’s cooperatives and women’s co-chairs in all political structures, to the autonomous military structure of the YPJ. The revolutionary ideas of the kurdish womens movement are the foundation on which the social and political system is built. Their anti-patriarchal values and lessons are put in practice, not just in the harsh guerrilla lifestyle of the kurdish mountains, but also in the arid lands of north-east Syria. This also means that it is not anymore a kurdish women movement. As Arab women develop and lead their own organizations, as well as Ezidi, Assyrian and Armenian women, together with many internationalists that came from abroad to join the revolution, a world-wide wave of anti-patriarchal and revolutionary new generations make even more clear that the revolution will be feminist or won’t be.

The role of anarchists in North-East Syria?
All this is just a glimpse of the incredibly complex network of events and forces unfolding in Syria. The collapse of the al-Assad regime closed a cycle opened in 2011 with the Arab spring, but more than a decade of war left new conflicts and old wounds that are still open, and won’t heal easily. We are witnessing a new Syria, with incredible challenges and difficulties, but also with exciting developments and revolutionary potential. Hegemonic power, regional and global ones, are trying to take advantage of the chaotic situations that unfolds during transitional periods. Local groups and communities were forced to organize and fight for their survival, with hope and dreams of a better future. The revolutionary process of North-East Syria is an extraordinary example of social transformation, with principles of libertarian socialism put into practice on a big scale.

Talking about an anarchist revolution won’t do justice to their claims for democratic confederalism, but it is important to notice how, on an ideological level, there are so many things we have in common. Their criticism on Marxism and state socialism, their focus on social ecology and the communalist ideas of Murray Bookchin, their focus on anti-patriarchal struggle beyond liberal feminism, focusing on the relation between male dominance and the inherent logic of domination of nation-states, their efforts to develop people’s self defense capacity as the only way to build autonomy. All those are point that we, as anarchists, can clearly find ourselves in.

Anarchists have played a critical role in solidarity with Rojava, joining internationalist committees, organizing campaigns and even traveling to defend the revolution. The kurdish movement welcomed us, sharing their bread and their guns with us as we took part of the resistance on the frontlines. We became a part of this revolution, allowing us to see how much we have to learn from it. We came to support this revolution, but we also came to learn, hoping that the experience from here will allow us to strengthen our movements and organizations. In doing that we found friends, we found comrades, and we experienced extraordinary glimpses of what a free society and a free life can be. This is something that will influence ourselves and our movements not just for this revolution, but also for the many revolutions that are yet to come.■

Têkoşîna Anarşîst
TA is a revolutionary anarchist organization working in NE Syria (Rojava).
tekosinaanarsist.noblogs.org/